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Abstract
This thesis addresses questions in the Economics of Crime regarding the effect
of crime on GDP per capita and its growth rate, and criminal choices. The first
part of the thesis presents evidence concerning the effect of crime on economic
outcomes in Italy. Using an Instrumental Variables (IV) strategy and a system GMM
approach, the empirical exercise identifies the effect of different crimes on GDP per
capita and its growth rate in Italian regions. Results indicate that crime related to
organised crime has a substantial negative effect on the economic performance of
Italian regions, with the southern regions of Italy driving the outcome.
The second part of this thesis sheds further light on the understanding of crimi-
nal choices using a dynamic discrete choice model able to replicate trends observed
in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97). The model offers a
unifying framework of the literature, presented in economics of crime, studying the
factors leading to criminal success. Its development accounts for criminal and/or
human capital accumulation and its impact on legal and illegal earnings. Estima-
tion of the parameters of the model is accomplished by the simulated method of mo-
ments. Results show a strong role for social criminal capital in defining successful
criminal activity. In addition, the estimated returns to experience in illegal activities
are larger compared to legal ones, but the percentage of young men committing of-
fences decreases when the opportunity cost of crime increases. The counterfactual
policy exercise suggests that policies aimed at increasing human capital for previous
offenders can have a significant effect over short and long-term.
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1 Introduction
The first attempt to study crime using an economic point of view is provided by
Gary Becker, 1968. Following Becker’s seminal work, the development of models
analysing criminal choices identified features enabling researchers to explain illegal
behaviour, not only within a static framework but also in a dynamic one. This helped
shed further light on the mechanism leading to criminal success and to a career in
the illicit sector. Along with theoretical work, the contributions to the economics
of crime literature use empirical evidence to understand illegal behaviour and its
impact on important economic dimensions, such as GDP per capita and its growth
rate. Recently developed panel estimation techniques allow for better understanding
of the impact of endogenous factors on economic performance. This thesis makes
use of the latter procedures in chapter two to answer the important question: What
is the relation between economic outcomes and crime? The exploitation of external
variation overcomes important issues that arise when exploring the above relation,
such as endogeneity, and leads to obtaining an adequate response.
Using data from the Italian National Institute for Statistics (ISTAT), the effect
of crime on the economy is analysed using Italy as a case study. The considerable
disparities among its regions, in terms of economic outcomes and crime rates, make
the country ideal for an empirical exercise with the aim of understanding the po-
tential effect of crime on regional economic performance. The analysis addresses
possible endogeneity issues through an instrumental variable approach and system
GMM estimators, with an external source of variation found in effective abortion
rate (Donohue and Levitt, 2000). Findings suggest that crime related to organised
crime has a large and negative effect on the economy of Italian regions, especially
in Southern Italy.
In order to reduce the costs that crime imposes on society, it is fundamental
to answer the following two questions: What determines criminal choices? Why
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do individuals repeatedly commit offences? These questions are fully explored in
this thesis, and an answer is provided in chapter three using an extensive dynamic
discrete choice model, which is able to repeat trends observed in the National Lon-
gitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97). The model offers a framework able to
unify empirical evidence and theories produced in the economics of crime literature
studying criminal capital. Its development accounts for the formation of skills that
can be used in legal and illegal markets and the effect of their accumulation on the
possible rewards in each sector. Estimation of the parameters included in the model
is conducted through the simulated method of moments, with results indicating a
strong role of social criminal capital in defining successful criminal activity. Simi-
larly, the estimated returns to experience in the illegal sector show a larger premium
for criminal activity compared to legal one. However, the percentage of young
men committing offences decreases when the opportunity cost of crime increases.
Counterfactual policy exercise, obtained for the model at the estimated parameters,
suggests that policies aimed at augmenting human capital for previous offenders
can have an important effect over short and long-term.
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2 How crime affects the economy: evidence from Italy
2.1 Introduction
Data from ISTAT (Italian National Institute for Statistics) indicate that GDP per
capita is substantially different between the Italian average and the regions com-
prising Southern Italy. During the period 1995-2011, this discrepancy amounted to
almost C7,200 and reached circa C9,700 when calculated as difference between the
average GDP per capita of the Northern-Center macro-area and Mezzogiorno1.
Economists have widely investigated convergence in GDP growth rate across
Italian regions. Previous studies show that convergence has not generally occurred2,
except in the 1960s when the investments carried out through Cassa per il Mezzo-
giorno 3 led to the convergence.
Two factors that may explain the lack of convergence and the Italian economic
disparities are the large presence of crime and organised crime in Italy. Since the
1960s economists have tried to understand why people commit crime from an eco-
nomic perspective. This line of research started with the work of Gary Becker,
which assumes that a person commits an offence if the expected utility from crime
exceeds the utility that could be obtained using time and other resources in legiti-
mate activities. An extensive literature explaining the effect of crime on the econ-
omy is missing. The aim of this paper is to show how crime contributes to the
differences in the economic performances of Italian regions. In fact, the large pres-
ence of crime in an area may lead to a loss in opportunities for development and the
Italian case may be one of the best examples of this.
The economic literature has shown several channels through which crime could
have affected Italian development. The large presence of organised crime in the
1The term Mezzogiorno refers to the regions comprising the southern part of Italy.
2The results are based on analysis of both GDP per capita and productivity.
3Cassa del Mezzogiorno was a fund, established in 1950 and dissolved in 1984, used by the
Italian government to stimulate economic growth and development in Southern Italy.
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South of the country discourages corporate investment, including foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI). Using data on Italian provinces, Daniele and Mariani (2008) esti-
mate the impact of crime on the FDI inflow. The results of their analysis show that
the correlation between organised crime and FDI inflows is substantially negative
and statistically significant. Another factor that could affect the Italian economic
performance is the misallocation of public funding, with the Mafia attracting and
absorbing public funding, as suggested by Barone and Narcisio (2013). Accord-
ingly, a higher incidence of crime, especially offences related to organised crime,
can lead to higher interest rates and reduced access to credit (Bonaccorsi di Patti,
2009).
This work contributes to the literature by explicitly addressing potential endo-
geneity issues, such as simultaneous causality between GDP per capita and crime,
using a Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) estimator with an instrumental variable that
has its roots in the economics of crime literature. The obtained estimates indicate
that crime usually associated with organised crime substantially affects the eco-
nomic performance of Italian regions, especially in Southern Italy. The literature
investigating this issue is not extensive, and the approaches adopted by researchers
are varied.
Carmeci and Mauro (2007) use Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimators to ex-
plore the link between crime, unemployment and economic activity using Italian
regional data. They found that crime and unemployment have long-run effects on
the level of Italian regional income, but no long-run growth effects. Meanwhile,
Pinotti (2015) uses policy evaluation methods to study the economic effects of or-
ganised crime in two Italian regions (Apulia and Basilicata) recently exposed to the
presence of criminal associations of the Mafia type (since the 1970s). The compar-
ison of actual and counterfactual development shows that as the number of murders
increases, the presence of organised crime lowers the economic growth path. Fur-
14
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thermore, a lower GDP reflects a net loss in economic activity because less produc-
tive public capital substitutes private capital. Using difference GMM and system
GMM estimators, Rana and Neanidis (2013) explore the joint effect of organised
crime and corruption on the economic growth of Italian regions between 1983 and
2009. Their analysis shows that both corruption and organised crime inhibit growth,
but if both phenomena are present together in the area, the joint effect is less severe
due to organization in corruption leading to better coordination in the bureaucrat’s
rent-seeking behavior.
In this chapter, an external instrument for crime is used to solve possible en-
dogeneity issues. The chosen instrument is the ’effective abortion rate’ used by
Donohue and Levitt (2000) to explain the decrease in crime rate in the US during
the 1990s. The authors claim that the link between abortion and crime is causal,
thus possibly satisfying the condition of relevance of the instrument. Following
the argument proposed by Donohue and Levitt, effective abortion rate can have an
indirect positive effect on GDP per capita through its effects on crime. The latter
is a consequence of a possible decrease in the number of potential criminals due
to a cohort size effect and/or possible lower rates of criminality for children born
after the introduction of the abortion legislation. The instrumental variable is used
to construct the two stage least square and system GMM estimators of the effect
of crime on the economic performance of Italian regions. The results produced
from the aforementioned empirical strategy indicate that crime related to organised
crime activity has a substantial negative impact on GDP per capita and its growth
rate, especially in Mezzogiorno.
This chapter is structured as follows: the next section describes the data and the
importance of the research question. In Section 2.3, the theoretical motivations are
presented. Section 2.4 outlines the empirical methodology and discusses the instru-
ment for crime. Section 2.5 presents the results. Robustness checks are explored in
15
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Section 2.6. Section 2.7 provides the conclusion.
2.2 Data and preliminary analysis
Using data from ISTAT, this study utilises a panel of nineteen Italian regions4, dur-
ing the period 1995-2011, to determine the impact of crime on the economy.
The economic performance of Italian regions is measured by GDP per capita
(base year 2005). Homicide rate (attempted and committed) per 100,000 inhabitants
is the offence of interest in this work because of its strong correlation with homi-
cides related to the Mafia (as shown in Appendix A.1), thus representing a possible
good proxy for organised crime. Further, data on other types of crime, especially
those related to organised crime (such as extortions), are subject to under-reporting
and under-recording bias, whereas these problems are negligible for homicides.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the variation across Italian regions in terms of GDP per
capita and homicide rate. Calabria stands out as having the lowest level of GDP per
capita and the highest level of homicide rate. The homicide rate is generally higher
in the Southern part of Italy, which also presents lower levels of GDP per capita.
This may be due to reverse causality: GDP per capita may be lower because of the
presence of crime and organised crime, and their presence may be a consequence
of the economic situation of these regions. As shown in Figure 2.2, there is a strong
negative correlation between GDP per capita and homicide rate (figure 2.2 also
displays OLS fitted values).
Because of possible reverse causality, an instrumental variables approach is
adopted in this work. The approach involves the choice of an appropriate instrument
that is, for this case, the ’effective abortion rate’. Additional variables included in
the analysis and used as control variables are: the ratio of investment to GDP, the
ratio of regional government spending in construction and regional planning to total
4The analysis excludes Aosta Valley.
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regional government spending, the dropout rate after one year of high school, pop-
ulation density, an index for social capital, and the rate of firms creation (difference
between number of firms created and companies that ended their activity in a year,
divided by the number of firms existing the year before in the region).
The selection of control variables is suggested by the economic growth and
economics of crime literatures. Investments are a primary source of growth, while
government spending in construction plays a role in defining GDP and it is also
correlated with crime. Further, to control for possible youth preferences for crime
over employment opportunities, the drop-out rate from high school is preferred to
the level of human capital.
As suggested by the literature, social capital is likely to have a positive impact
on economic activity, and be negatively correlated with crime. The definition of a
social capital index follows the work of Putnam (2000), which considers trust and
social participation as the most general forms of social capital, with volunteering
activity being part of the latter category. Putnam argues that participation in vol-
untary organisations and social associations promotes, among members, collective
norms and trust, which is fundamental for the production and the maintenance of
the community’s well-being. Thus, the use of the ratio of people, aged at least 14,
engaged in volunteering activities to the total population, of the same age, should
partially capture the level of social capital in the region. The set of independent
variables is used in natural logarithm term, except for population density.
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Figure 2.1: HETEROGENEITY ACROSS ITALIAN REGIONS IN TERMS OF GDP PER
CAPITA AND HOMICIDE RATE (PER 100,000 INHABITANTS), AVERAGE 1995-
2011
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics for the aforementioned variables for Ital-
ian regions and the subsample ’South’ comprised of Campania, Apulia, Basilicata,
Calabria and Sicily. Descriptive statistics indicate that the average of the GDP per
capita for the full sample is almost C7,200 higher than the South subsample, while
the mean for the homicide rate almost doubles if considering only the southern
regions - the difference between the two means increases when considering only
Northern-Central regions. In particular, Calabria has the lowest level of GDP per
capita (1995) and the highest homicide rate (in 1996). Lombardy has the highest
GDP per capita (in 2007), while the lowest growth rate is in Piedmont (in 2009).
Data pattern suggests the urgency of understanding and providing an answer to
the Italian dualism.
Hereafter, the term South always denotes the macro-area formed by Campania,
Apulia, Basilicata, Calabria and Sicily.
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Figure 2.2: GDP PER CAPITA AND HOMICIDE RATE
Table 2.1: SUMMARY STATISTICS
ITALY SOUTH
VARIABLES Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
GDP per capita 22,659 5,668 12,892 31,848 15,478 969.0 12,892 17,417
Homicide rate 3.682 2.267 0.89 13.35 6.403 2.563 2.720 13.35
Growth rate (%) 0.439 2.390 -9.132 5.315 0.689 2.35 -5.88 5.31
I/GDP 0.213 0.0276 0.152 0.304 0.220 0.0186 0.178 0.263
Construction/Government spending 0.021 0.003 0.010 0.028 0.0205 0.005 0.012 0.028
Dropout rate (%) 7.40 2.25 1.6 15.1 8.658 1.858 4.700 12.60
Population density 197.3 107.2 58.70 434.5 207.1 123.8 58.70 434.5
Rate of firms creation (%) 1.38 1.075 -2.67 6.29 1.673 1.235 -1.200 4.300
Social capital (%) 11.08 4.854 4.421 27.70 6.973 1.526 4.421 12.10
2.3 Theoretical motivation
This section defines the mechanism through which a high presence of crime can
have an impact on economic performance.
Region i at time t obtains its output using the following production function with
labour-augmenting technological progress:
Yit = F(Kit ,Ait(Crit)Lit) (2.1)
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whereYit is a function of capital,Kit -that depreciates at rateδ -, technological progress,
Ait -which grows at rate g-, and labour,Lit -that increases at rate n. A fraction of the
output is consumed, cYit -with 0<c<1-, while the emerging saved share, s , is used
for investments that lead to an increase in capital,
.
Kit = Iit −δKit . In contrast with
the Solow growth model (1957), the term Ait depends on crime and its level de-
creases for any increase in crime, with ∂Ait∂Crit < 0, while the key assumptions remain
the same as Solow’s model.
Given constant returns to scale, the output is rewritten in terms of output per
efficiency unit of labour as:
yit =
Yit
Ait(Crit)Lit
=
1
Ait(Crit)Lit
F(Kit ,Ait(Crit)Lit) = f (kit) (2.2)
where kit = KitAit(Crit)Lit . This form underlines the strong dependence of output on
the level of capital per efficiency unit.
Crime also has to be taken into account in the resource constraint. In fact, re-
sources are used for protection and prevention while investments are discouraged if
crime is widely present in the region, thus causing wasted resources. Further, the
presence of criminal organisations in the region can lead to a flow of money out of
the legal economy through pizzo5. This leads to a resource constraint, in intensive
form, for the economy given by:
cit+ iit+(wastedresources)it = yit = f (kit) (2.3)
where, following Peri (2004), the wasted resources are funded through a tax
whose amount depends on the level of crime in the region, wastedresourcesit =
τ(Crit)yit .
The investment equation has to account for the presence of the tax, Iit = Sit =
5“Pizzo” is an Italian word derived from the Sicilian word “pizzu” that means extortion. It
indicates the money paid by business to Mafia for protection.
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(1− τ(Crit))sYit , and the low of motion for capital can be rewritten as in (2.4):
.
Kit = (1− τ(Crit))sYit−δKit (2.4)
which leads to the fundamental equation of motion:
.
kit = (1− τ(Crit))s f (kit)− kit(δ +g+n) (2.5)
From equation (2.5) it emerges that a higher tax implies a lower level of capital
accumulation, and, as consequence, a lower level of output.
This work does not attempt to estimate the equations presented in this section,
but some of their elements can be found in the empirical part of the study, e.g.
investment and population density as a proxy for population growth.
2.4 Empirical methodology
The empirical model, which has GDP per capita as dependent variable, is:
Yit = αi+β1t+β2Crimeit+ γXit+δ1DUi2008+δ2DUi2009+ εit (2.6)
where Yit is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in region i in period t, t
is a time trend, Crimeit is the natural logarithm of the homicide rate, X is a vector
of control variables comprising the ratio of investment to GDP, the ratio of regional
government spending in construction and regional planning to total regional govern-
ment spending, the drop out rate after one year of high school, population density
and an index of social capital, and the rate of firms creation. DUi2008 and DUi2009
are two binary variables being equal to 1 if in year 2008 and 2009, respectively, and
used to account for the impact of the beginning of the economic crisis in Italy. αi is
a time-invariant region specific effect, while ε it is the error term. Control variables
are in logarithm terms except for population density. The empirical model accounts
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for the time factor using a linear trend, and considers the Italian economic crisis
using two yearly binary variables, corresponding to the start of the economic crisis
in Italy.
The empirical model that uses growth rate as dependent variable is:
Yit−Yit−1 = θ1Yit−1+θ2Crimeit+ρXit+σ1DUi2008+σ2DUi2009+uit (2.7)
with Yit−1 potentially correlated with the error term and thus potentially en-
dogenous 6. The model does not present a trend since the use of first differences
eliminates it.
Equation (2.6) is estimated using the two stage least square in order to obtain
a consistent estimator for β2, while the System GMM estimator 7 developed by
Arellano-Bond (1991), Arellano-Bover (1995) and Blundell-Bond (1998)8 is used
to achieve consistent estimates for equation (2.7).
A difficulty associated with the chosen estimation strategies relates to the choice
of the external instrument and of the number of lags to use for the construction of
the internal ones. In estimating equation (2.7), a lag of two to a maximum of four
is used and the instruments are collapsed9.
The next section explains the choice of the external instrumental variable.
6The specification does not include a trend since Yt is trend stationary. Using first difference
eliminates the trend.
7The use of the system GMM estimators allows to wipe out the region fixed effects.
8System-GMM estimation treats the model as a system of equations in first-differences and in
levels. It uses the lags of the potential endogenous variables in order to obtain internal instruments
that will be used in this work in addition to the external instrument used in the 2SLS estimation.
9Collapsing instruments allows to reduce the number of instruments through the creation of one
instrument for each variable and lag distance, instead of one instrument for each year, variable, and
lag distance. In addition, the limitation of the number of lags helps in achieving the goal of having a
number of instruments smaller than the number of entities composing the panel.
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2.4.1 The instrument for crime
Donohue and Levitt (2000) argue that a decline in crime rates in the U.S. during the
1990s followed from the abortion legalization. Their claim is that the link between
abortion and crime is causal, and it is based on the following consideration: legal-
ized abortion may lead to reduced crime rates through either a cohort size effect
and/or possible lower rates of criminality for children born after the introduction of
the abortion legislation.
The cohort size effect relies on the fact that when the cohort reaches the crimi-
nal age, there will be fewer people in their highest-propensity crime years, and thus
less crime. The second possible explanation follows from the consideration that
women’s ability for child care may vary with age, education and income; conse-
quently, abortion may be used to optimize the timing of child-bearing.10.
In Italy, legislation introduced abortion in 1978 through Law 194/1978. This law
allows a woman to stop her pregnancy during the first ninety days of childbearing
in a health care institution, such as a hospital. Data on abortion rates for 1,000
women are available from 1979, the first entire year that the law came to effect,
while data on GDP per capita and crime are available from 1995 to 2011. This
allows to construct a variable that follows Levitt’s aforementioned considerations.
The following equation shows the construction of the external instrument:
E f f ectiveAbortionit =∑
a
Abit−a (2.8)
The effective abortion rate for region i at time t is given by the sum of the
abortion rate in the region at time t - a, where a is the age of the cohort. Data on
abortion cover the period from 1979 to 1995. Hence, for the year 1995, the effective
10Unfortunately, there is not a good amount of information about women who choose abortion in
Italy during the time period of interest. The available information reveals that at least 27% of women
choosing abortion are not married (the percentage increases with time) and that an increase in the
level of schooling corresponds to a decrease in abortion.
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abortion rate is the abortion rate in 1979 (with a cohort age of sixteen). For 1996, the
effective abortion rate is the abortion rate in 1979 plus abortion rate in 1980 (cohort
ages are 16 and 17). The operation is repeated until 2011, where the abortion rates
from 1995 are used to construct the effective abortion rate of the period.
The proposed instrument is different from the effective abortion rate used by
Donohue and Levitt (2000). This is due to the different aims of the two works. In
this study, effective abortion rate represents an instrument for crime and the focus
is on determining whether the instrument is relevant and exogenous or not.
Levitt’s arguments justify a potential relevance of the instrument. The con-
siderations for exogeneity attempt to identify a non-direct link between effective
abortion rate and GDP per capita and its growth rate. The exogeneity condition is
explored using a different dataset, available from CRENOS. Using data on GDP
per capita and abortion rate for 1,000 women, for the period 1979-1995, the es-
timated correlation coefficient between the two variables is small and statistically
insignificant even when considering a lagged effect of abortion on GDP per capita
(see Appendix A.2). This indicates that the productivity shock, potentially faced by
a woman choosing abortion, is not transmitted to the GDP per capita. Instead, the
effect of effective abortion rate on the economic performance from 1995 to 2011 is
positive and significant (table 2.3), indicating a possible impact of effective abortion
on GDP through its effect on crime.
The following reduced form equation is used to obtain the Two Stage Least
Square (2SLS) estimator:
Crimeit = αi+β1t+pi1E f f ectiveAbortionit+ γXit+δ1DUi2008+δ2DUi2009+ vit
(2.9)
with results presented and discussed in section 2.5.
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2.5 Results
This section presents estimation results for equation (2.6). Different specifications
of the model are presented to allow for a comparison of the results. If the hypothesis
that crime is one of the factors explaining the Italian economic disparities is correct,
the results of the regression model should show a negative effect of homicide rate
on the GDP per capita. Using homicide rate as a crime variable enables to capture
part of the effect that organised crime has on the economy, especially in Southern
Italy.
Table 2.2 shows Pooled Ordinary Least Square (POLS) and fixed effects es-
timator results. The two approaches present different negative magnitudes of the
estimated effect of crime, but the latter is highly statistically significant in almost
all specifications. In particular, the estimations show a decreasing magnitude (in
absolute value) as the number of covariates increases. This suggests the possibility
of omitted variable bias for the estimations with only homicide rate as regressor.
Furthermore, fixed effects estimation results present a smaller coefficient (in
absolute value) in all specifications, meaning that it is important to control for time-
invariant region characteristics. They also suggest the presence of a potential ad-
ditional source of endogeneity: measurement error. Murder rate may capture or-
ganised crime presence with error, and this helps to explain the large difference in
magnitudes for the coefficients observed in table 2.2 obtained with the two estima-
tion strategies. Moreover, as previously argued, the possible endogeneity issue, due
to reverse causality between GDP per capita and crime, may further invalidate the
results obtained with the two methods.
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Table 2.2: POLS AND FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION OF EQUATION (2.6)
POLS FIXED EFFECTS
ln(Homicide rate) -0.310*** -0.310*** -0.117*** -0.127*** -0.042** -0.038*** -0.029 -0.028***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.014) (0.018) (0.011) (0.021) (0.011)
Control variables no no yes yes no no yes yes
Time specification no yes no yes no yes no yes
Observations 323 323 289 289 323 323 289 289
R2 0.394 0.414 0.791 0.812 0.04 0.705 0.398 0.755
Adj. R2 0.393 0.407 0.786 0.805 0.037 0.701 0.383 0.746
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parenthesis
The 2SLS estimators, proposed in table 2.4, capture the effect of crime for
the sample, comprising nineteen Italian regions, and a sub-sample of five of them
(South in the tables): Apulia, Calabria, Campania, Basilicata and Sicily. In this
way, it is possible to compare the results for the two samples in order to under-
stand which part of the effect belongs to the South11. Instead, table 2.3 presents
the estimated effect of the effective abortion rate on GDP per capita (both in natural
logarithm terms). The results in table 2.3 support the claim that the instrument has a
positive effect on the economic performance through its effect on crime. The latter
result arises from a possible reduction in crime rate due to effective abortion rate
(shown in table 2.4). Reduced form regression results presented in Table 2.4 allow
to explore the determinants of homicide rate in the two samples. It is worth noting
the large difference in magnitude and direction of the estimated effect of regional
government spending for housing on homicide rate in the samples. The cited differ-
ence may capture a possible distortion in the allocation of government spending in
Southern Italy due to the presence of organised crime in the territory. Social capital
produces the expected effect for both groups (consistently with the results obtained
in the literature on social capital and crime), and the same is true for population
11The results for South should be read with caution due to the small subsample size.
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density.
Table 2.3: ESTIMATION OF THE EFFECT OF ABORTION RATE ON GDP PER
CAPITA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable:
ln(GDP per capitait ) ITALY SOUTH
ln(Effective abortion rate) 0.032*** 0.029*** 0.020*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.023***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006)
Control variables no yes yes no yes yes
Time specification no no yes no no yes
NOTE: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parenthesis
Furthermore, the results for the reduced form equation indicate that effective
abortion rate has a negative impact on crime (as argued by Levitt, 2000) and is
highly significant in all specified models. Additionally, the estimated impact is
larger for the restricted sample of the southern regions. The reported statistics show
that effective abortion rate is not a weak instrument for five out of six model spec-
ifications. Only in column two, an F-statistic slightly lower than ten is observed.
The endogenous regressor is also not underidentified, as denoted by the reported
Sanderson-Windmeijer statistics (S.W.).
Table 2.5 displays the 2SLS results for equation (2.6). The results suggest that a
1% increase in homicide rate leads to a decrease in GDP per capita by circa 0.32%
(column (3)). Restricting the sample to Southern regions, the corresponding de-
crease is almost 0.26% (column (6)). A comparison of the estimated coefficients
of crime for the two samples suggests that Mezzogiorno is driving the results. Fur-
thermore, the estimation results for the control variables indicate that government
spending has a large positive effect in defining the GDP per capita of the southern
area, with a magnitude that is larger than the one presented for the private invest-
ments. Consequently, this may indicate the deficiency of the southern area in cap-
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turing the benefits of private investments and a large dependence on public funding
(as in Pinotti, 2015).
Comparing tables 2.2 and 2.5, the effect of crime on GDP per capita is upward
biased when estimated with POLS and in fixed effects specifications, with the bias
increasing its magnitude in the second specification. The bias is partially corrected
by including variables that are positively correlated with crime and have a positive
impact on GDP, such as government spending and population density, or adding
variables that are correlated with crime and GDP in a negative manner. The IV
strategy allows to further capture the upward bias, which may be the consequence
of the unobserved corruption, whose effects are mitigate when the phenomenon
is present along with organised crime (Neandis and Rana, 2013). But the results
emerging from the comparison of the two tables strongly suggest that the bias is
not only due to omitted variables. In fact, adding controls reduces the estimates
magnitude in tables 2.2 and 2.5, but the IV estimation presents a much higher coef-
ficient (in absolute value) in all specifications. This can be due to the fact that the
IV strategy allows to address the endogeneity issue, previously discussed, arising
from reverse causality. An additional explanation is that homicide rate is measuring
the presence of organised crime in the territory with error, and the IV strategy is
addressing also this potential source of endogeneity.
2.5.1 The effect of crime on economic growth
Estimating the effect of crime on growth rate, using a dynamic panel model, leads to
two potentially endogenous regressors. The estimation strategy adopted to control
for the potential endogeneity problem is the system GMM (Arellano-Bond, 1991;
Arellano-Bover, 1995; Blundell-Bond, 1998). In contrast to the Difference GMM,
the system GMM estimator uses lags of potential endogenous variables in level and
first differences for the construction of internal instruments. In addition, the external
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instrument already used in the 2SLS estimation (the effective abortion rate) can be
used along with the internal ones.
Estimation results for equation (2.7), using the system GMM estimator, are in
table 2.6. Column (2) shows that crime produces a negative effect on growth rate.
An increase of 1% in the homicide rate leads to a decrease in the growth rate by
0.04%. These small magnitudes are still important considering that Italy has expe-
rienced low growth rates and periods of recession for the past 20 years.
Table 2.6: ESTIMATION OF THE EFFECT OF CRIME ON ECONOMIC GROWTH
Dependent variable: (1) (2)
4ln(GDP per capitait)
GDP per capitait−1 0.003 -0.025
(0.002) (0.014)
Homicide rate -0.02 -0.045**
(0.017) (0.019)
Social capital -0.009
(0.009)
Dropout rate 0.026**
(0.012)
Construction/Government spending -0.063*
(0.033)
Investment/GDP -0.023
(0.026)
Firms creation rate 0.002
(0.003)
Population density -0.000
(0.000)
DUi2008 -0.031***
(0.008)
DUi2009 -0.068***
(0.007)
Observations 304 272
No. of instruments 7 15
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences, -2.88 -0.70
p-value 0.004 0.484
Hansen test, 7.64 9.10
p-value 0.177 0.105
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in brackets
To verify the validity of the instruments two tests are conducted. The first test
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is the Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences, with the null hypothesis
being the absence of auto-correlation in the residuals using a lag length of two. It is
not possible to reject the null hypothesis, and consequently the internal instruments,
with at least a lag of two, are not endogenous. The Hansen test controls the validity
of the instruments using the null hypothesis that the covariance among the instru-
ments and the error term is zero. The associated p-value of 0.105 indicates that null
hypothesis of exogeneity of the entire set of instruments cannot be rejected.
The results presented in this section suggest that crime has a statistically signif-
icant and negative impact on economic performances of Italian regions, especially
in the South subsample. Given the higher level of homicide - typically associated
with organised crime associations - in Southern Italy, results indicate that crimes re-
lated to criminal organisations can partially explain the lack of convergence across
regions in Italy and the Italian dualism.
2.6 Robustness checks
Robustness checks try to further assess the exogeneity of the instrument using in-
ternal instruments in addition to effective abortion rate. This allows the use of the
Hansen test to check for the validity of the entire set of instruments. In fact, it is
not possible to judge whether an instrument is exogenous in a just identified model,
but in the presence of more instruments the Hansen test can help in deciding on the
validity of the instruments.
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Table 2.7: ESTIMATION OF EQUATION (2.6) VIA SYSTEM GMM
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable:
ln(GDP per capitait )
Homicide rate -0.484*** -0.378*** -0.230*
(0.100) (0.081) (0.119)
Trend 0.009*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.004)
DUi2008 0.090*** 0.086**
(0.017) (0.038)
DUi2009 0.002 -0.021
(0.019) (0.028)
Social Capital 0.323***
(0.098)
Drop Out rate -0.002
(0.068)
Construction/Government spending -0.018
(0.120)
Investment/GDP -0.329*
(0.178)
Firms creation rate 0.008
(0.010)
Population Density 0.000*
(0.000)
Constant 10.555*** 10.374*** 8.770***
(0.120) (0.104) (0.491)
Observations 323 323 289
No. of instruments 5 8 14
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences, 0.01 0.63 0.28
p-value 0.991 0.527 0.776
Hansen test, 1.69 2.45 4.06
p-value 0.64 0.484 0.256
NOTE: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in brackets
The results in table 2.7 are similar in magnitude to the ones obtained in section
2.5 with different specifications of the model. In contrast to the previous section,
the number of instruments here is greater than one. In addition to effective abortion
rate, the internal instruments are used to obtain a consistent estimator of the effect
of crime. AR(2) test results indicate that it is possible to use internal instruments
starting from a lag of two for the specifications of column (2) and (3), while the set
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of instruments is exogenous for the three models.
In the following, an attempt to assess whether crime related to organised crime
is the one with the larger negative effect on the economy is conducted. If organ-
ised crime is one of the factors explaining the Italian dualism, using types of crime
not strictly related to Mafia type associations - and whose distribution is more ho-
mogeneous among Italian regions - to estimate the effect of crime on the economy
should lead to different results from what obtained in section 2.5. Bank robberies
(per 100,000 inhabitants) and bag-snatching (per 100,000 inhabitants) are used to
determine whether other kinds of crime, not necessarily associated with criminal
organisations of the Mafia type, have a smaller impact on the economy compared to
homicide rate.
Figure 2.3 furnishes a qualitative analysis of data on bank robberies and bag-
snatching. The figure shows that the level of bag-snatching is almost uniform across
the regions, while bank robbery rate tends to be higher for regions with a higher
level of GDP per capita.
Equations (2.6) and (2.7) are re-estimated using the natural logarithm of bank
robberies and bag-snatching as crime variable. The results of the 2SLS estimators
are presented in Table 2.8, while system GMM results can be found in Table 2.9.
In Table 2.8, the results of the reduced form for both variables are reported in
columns (1) and (2), while columns (3) and (4) report second stage regression re-
sults. Bank robberies and bag-snatching have a negative and statistically significant
effect on GDP per capita, but are smaller in magnitude compared to murder rate.
F and SW statistics indicate that the instrument is not weak in all regression mod-
els, and the potential endogenous regressor is not under-identified. Moreover, the
magnitude of effective abortion rate coefficient, in both cases, is larger than the one
found in table 2.4.
Table 2.9 presents the estimated effect of bank robberies and bag-snatching on
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Italian regional economic growth. Results for bank robberies are in column (1),
while results for bag-snatching can be found in column (2). Bank robberies and
bag-snatching have a positive but insignificant effect on economic growth. The
tests for the validity of the instruments reported in Table 2.9 reveal that the null
hypothesis of absence of covariance among the instruments and the error term can
be rejected at a 10% significance level for the model in column (1), while it cannot
be reject for the model in column (2) .
This section proved the exogeneity of the external instrument and how crimes
that may not be related to organised crime have a smaller effect on the economic
performance of Italian regions if compared to homicides (usually related to mafia
associations).
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Table 2.9: THE EFFECT OF BANK ROBBERIES AND BAG-SNATCHING ON THE
ECONOMIC GROWTH OF ITALIAN REGIONS
Dependent variable: (1) (2)
4GDP per capitait
GDP per capitait−1 -0.009 -0.004
(0.015) (0.011)
Bank robberies 0.012
(0.009)
Bag-snatching 0.007
(0.009)
Social capital -0.004 -0.007
(0.015) (0.009)
Dropout rate 0.001 -0.004
(0.009) (0.009)
Construction/Government spending -0.013 -0.006
(0.025) (0.029)
Investment/GDP -0.028 -0.021
(0.043) (0.024)
Firms creation rate -0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.002)
Population density -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Dui2008 -0.030*** -0.030***
(0.008) (0.005)
DUi2009 -0.058*** -0.063***
(0.012) (0.008)
Observations 268 272
No. of instruments 17 17
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences, -0.68 -0.57
p-value 0.495 0.562
Hansen test, 13.46 9.80
p-value 0.06 0.200
NOTE: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in brackets
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2.7 Conclusions
This study provides consistent estimates of the effect of homicide rate on the eco-
nomic performances of Italian regions. The choice of homicide rate as a regressor is
due to its strong correlation with murder rate associated to the Mafia, thus providing
a valid proxy for organised crime. Moreover, data on other crimes are not reliable
due to under-reporting and under-recording bias, especially those related to Mafia
type associations.
The estimation strategy addresses potential endogeneity issues by using effec-
tive abortion rate as an instrument for homicide rate. The chosen instrument has its
roots in the economics of crime literature and the statistics presented in the work
show its validity. The empirical exercises indicate that crime may play an important
role in determining the Italian regional economic disparities, since it inhibits the
growth path and has a large effect on the level of GDP per capita.
Robustness checks show how other types of crime, which do not require an or-
ganised crime association of the Mafia type and whose distribution is more homoge-
neous among Italian regions, have smaller effects on GDP per capita and negligible
impact on growth rate.
The findings of this study suggest several aspects on which policy makers should
focus to fight crime and its consequences. For example, as showed by the reduced
form results, dropout rate from high school has a positive and statistically significant
impact on murder rate in Southern Italy. This means that policy makers should pay
more attention to territories characterized by high youth unemployment rate, and
provide opportunities to develop skills to use in the legal sector in order to decrease
the number of potential affiliates in criminal organisations. The results section also
showed that a greater effort in increasing social capital can lead to a reduction in
crime, which would be beneficial for the economy through a boost in trust among
citizens.
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If the effect of illicit activities on the economy is neglected, the potential benefits
of policies aimed to improve economic performance in Italy would be wiped out by
crime. This is particularly important for a country like Italy which has not been able
to achieve high growth rates for twenty years.
Further research is needed to understand the complex relation between crime
and economic outcomes. A longer time period could be used to understand when
and through which channels crime and organised crime started to affect the econ-
omy of Italy and its Southern regions.
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3 Does crime pay? Criminal Versus Human Capital
3.1 Introduction
Crime imposes enormous costs on society. In 2014, there were an estimated 8,277,829
property crime offences in the U.S. with an equivalent estimated losses of $14.3
billion. During the period 2010-2014, property crimes exhibit a lower decrease
compared to violent crimes, with data on arrests for 2014 showing that individu-
als under the age of 25 accounted for 43% of the arrestees for the former crime
category. The latter figure provides some evidence of crime trends during life cy-
cle. Crime rates typically increase with age during adolescence, but decline in early
adulthood. Lochner (2004) explained this pattern using a human capital approach
where the opportunity cost of crime increases with human capital. Machin et al.
(2011) provide further evidence of the deterrent effect of education on crime, while
Campaniello, Gray and Mastrobuoni (2016) estimate positive returns to education
for professional criminals.
But, why do individuals repeatedly commit offences? What happens during the
adolescent years and the early adulthood? In order to comprehend criminal choices,
it is crucial to understand the factors defining criminal success, and this is what the
present study attempts to do.
This chapter contributes to the literature by presenting a dynamic discrete choice
model for young men, which proposes a mechanism underlying criminal choices.
It reveals the channels leading to criminal and human capital accumulation. These
channels constitute the basis to obtain a unifying framework of theories and empir-
ical evidence produced in the criminal capital literature. Consistently with empiri-
cal evidence produced in previous studies, this work emphasises the importance of
social criminal capital. The latter is critical in identifying important factors associ-
ated to criminal choices, such as illegal earnings and probability of apprehension.
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Results indicate that there are important wage premiums in the illegal sector for
individuals interacting with delinquents, thus capturing the importance of a ‘school
of crime’ effect in criminal choices determination.
Criminal capital represents a type of human capital that can facilitate successful
criminal activity (McCarty & Hogan, 1995) and it is measured using experience
in crime and criminal embeddedness. The first measure refers to the accumulation
of experience through criminal decisions and, as a consequence, criminal capital
via a learning by doing process. The second one refers to potential of criminal
capital accumulation through interaction with delinquent peers. Differently from
legal human capital, formal schools of crime to facilitate the acquisition of criminal
skills or knowledge do not exist. It is not possible to attend a ’school of crime.’
However, ongoing social relations with criminals can play a fundamental role in
transferring relevant skills and in providing informal criminal training.
Although criminal capital may be fundamental in identifying criminal choices,
only few studies take into account its formation. Mocan et al. (2005) are the first to
present a dynamic model of criminal activity where individuals are endowed with
two types of human capital: legal human capital and criminal human capital. They
underline the importance of the dynamics for the study of criminal activity and
identify prison as a potential source of criminal human capital.
A dynamic model for juvenile crime is proposed in Merlo and Wolpin (2009).
Their work focuses on the decisions of black young men and fits the data observed
in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97), but it does not ex-
plicitly account for accumulation of criminal capital and the effect that time spent
in prison can have on future criminal activity. Empirical evidence of the positive
effect of time spent in prison on criminal capital accumulation is provided by Bayer
et al. (2005), while Loughran et al. (2013) show that there are important illegal
wage premiums associated with investments in criminal capital. Munyo (2015) de-
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velops a model that includes the aforementioned empirical evidence and manages to
explain the recent increase in the juvenile crime trends in Uruguay, with calibration
techniques delivering the parameters of his model.
On the contrary, Mancino et al. (2015) use data on serious offenders to identify
the roles of state dependence, returns to experience, and heterogeneity in deter-
mining crime and school decisions of youth. Their findings reveal that the choice
between crime and school enrolment is largely affected by state dependence and
heterogeneity. However, their work is not useful to study the choice of becoming a
serious offender due to the nature of their dataset.
The cited studies fail to account for the importance of social criminal capital, not
acquired in correction facilities, when modelling illegal capital formation. In con-
trast, empirical evidence suggests that early exposure to neighbourhood crime has a
positive effect on subsequent criminal behaviour of youths (Damm and Dustmann,
2014). Moreover, an increase in the probability of arrest, for the homeless, is asso-
ciated with an increase in the share of criminal friends in the group, Corno (2012)
-with the probability of arrest used as an imperfect proxy for criminal behaviour.
In order to provide a theoretical framework able to expand previous theories and
include the aforementioned empirical findings, a dynamic discrete choice model is
used to understand the choices of young men, employing data from the NLSY97.
Data from NLSY97 offer a rich set of information on each respondent’s criminal
activity and criminal justice history. The set of available information also includes
data on criminal organisations in respondent’s neighbourhoods (gangs), and data
on whether someone close to the respondent is part of such organisations. Further-
more, it contains data on enrolment status in education, number of hours worked
and income from legal and illegal sources.
Using NLSY97, the model matches the actual data well at the estimated parame-
ters, being able to repeat trends in crime, school and work. Results from the DCDP
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are consistent with empirical evidence produced in the criminal capital literature.
Legal and ‘illegal schooling’ have a positive and large effect for both criminal and
legal wages, meaning that schooling plays a key role in the determination of illegal
and legal rewards. The estimate of the returns to crime shows a larger premium
for criminal activity compared to work experience. In fact, as opposed to labour
market employment, experience in crime can lead to a potentially more profitable,
albeit riskier, activity.
The model is also used for policy simulations aimed at decreasing juvenile
crime. In particular, a decrease of 10% in the probability of having a delinquent
peer is associated with a decrease in crime of 1.6%, while an increase in the oppor-
tunity cost of crime can decrease the proportion of people choosing illegal behaviour
by 3% and recidivism by 23%.
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 presents the data, while Sec-
tion 3.3 shows the mechanism of the model. In Section 3.4 results for estimations
are reported along with model fit. Section 3.5 presents policy simulations and Sec-
tion 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Data
Data used in this work are from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997
(NLSY97). NLSY97 is a longitudinal project that follows 9000 young Americans
born between 1980 and 1984, making them 12-17 years of age when first inter-
viewed in 1997. Males constitute approximately half of the sample. The survey
is conducted every year and it provides information about several aspects of the
youths’ lives, such as school enrolment, worked hours, wages, family income, par-
ents’ education, criminal activity and exposure to the criminal justice system. Ques-
tions on criminal activity explore the types of crimes committed, the number of
times -since the last interview- the youth was involved in a particular crime, and
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illegal income from criminal activity. Information on illegal behaviour is available
for the whole sample until 2005, and only for respondents with criminal justice
history in subsequent rounds.
This work uses a sub-sample of the NLSY97 composed of males who were 14
years old in 1997 or in 1998 and follows them until the age of 22. Each youth was
recorded as working during the decision period if he spent more than 780 hours12 in
employment (as in Merlo and Wolpin, 2009), while he was registered as attending
school if reported as enrolled during the year. Event history data are not available
for illegal activity. During each survey round, crime related questions are asked to
determine the number of times a youth committed a crime since the date of the last
interview –types of crime used in the work are: stealing something worth 50 dollars
or more, other property crimes (e.g. fencing stolen property), and selling drugs.
The strategy adopted by Merlo and Wolpin (2009) to deal with the absence of event
history data is also used in this work. In addition to the data on criminal activity,
the answer to a specific question on whether a brother/sister or a friend is part of
a gang is used to identify social criminal capital (later defined as Soca). Data on
arrest and incarceration status are collected monthly and used to construct the arrest
and imprisonment history of an individual during each time period. Lastly, if the
individual reports that he is not enrolled in education, nor is he employed, and has
not committed a crime, he is registered as being at home.
Table 3.1 presents the choice distribution by age. It shows that 88% of individ-
uals aged 14 choose school over the other alternatives, and that an additional 10%
choose school in combination with either crime or work, thus leading to a vast ma-
jority of individuals in education at age 14. This number decreases over-time and,
as expected, presents the biggest drop at age 18 -normal high school graduation
age. The opposite pattern can be observed for the working alternative. From table
12This threshold is useful to potentially exclude youth employed only during summer.
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3.1, it appears that some individuals switched from school and crime to work and
crime between age 17-18 and 18-19. Given the previously stated residual definition
of home, it may be that the youths classified as being at home worked for less than
780 hours during the calendar year, or his time spent at school was not enough to
classify him as at school for the period. A jump in the home choice is registered at
age 18, when there may be a transitional period from school to work.
Table 3.1: CHOICE DISTRIBUTION: YOUNG MEN AGED 14-22
Age Home School Work Crime
Crime and Crime and School and
Total
School Work Work
14 1.9 87.79 0.06 0.28 8.47 0 1.51 1794
15 2.34 82.33 0.23 0.47 11.23 0.06 3.34 1709
16 3.99 74.55 1.09 0.6 8.59 0.3 10.88 1654
17 6.47 56.16 3.45 1.6 7.57 0.86 23.89 1624
18 16.65 35.99 16.71 2.76 4.02 2.64 21.23 1592
19 19.16 23.74 30.02 2.03 2.16 4.51 18.38 1529
20 16.79 18.69 40.04 1.36 0.88 3.54 18.69 1471
21 16.64 16.79 46 0.57 0.21 1.93 17.86 1400
22 14.69 13.53 52.36 0.87 0.36 1.38 16.8 1375
Total 10.5 47.77 19.49 1.16 5.14 1.62 14.33 14148
NOTES: Figures are row percentages. Total number of observations is reported in column
Total.
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Figure 3.1: CHOICE DISTRIBUTION: YOUNG MEN AGED 14-22
The described patterns become evident when looking at Figure 3.1. It shows the
jump in home and work alternatives at age 18, and perfectly displays the decreasing
trend of schooling choices and the increasing one for work. The switch from crime
and school to crime and work can also be easily identified.
Table 3.2 reports the transition matrix for the seven alternatives, with the figure
in each cell representing the percentage of transitions from origin to destination.
The school choice presents high persistence, as shown in Table 3.2 where about
72% of the time a youth chooses to stay in school if previously enrolled. This is not
surprising given the age of the sample.
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Table 3.2: ONE-YEAR ALTERNATIVES TRANSITION MATRIX
Choice (a)
Choice(a-1) Home School Work Crime
Crime and Crime and School
School Work and Work
Home 47.8 11.7 30.4 31.0 0.8 2.04 4.08
School 6.22 71.8 4.3 0.6 51.5 0.28 11.6
Work 10.2 16.9 77.34 0.54 0.11 3.32 6.81
Crime 40.91 6.1 15.15 18.18 6.1 9.85 3.79
Crime and School 7.26 41.53 3.09 4.03 28.76 3.23 12.1
Crime and Work 9.95 2.09 51.31 3.14 1.57 25.65 6.28
School and Work 5.58 18.02 24.06 0.35 1.41 1.88 48.71
NOTES: Figures are row percentages.
A similar figure emerges for the work alternative, where 77% of individuals
choosing work repeat their choice the next period. State dependence can also be
found for the home alternative and the combined choice of school and work. The
alternatives concerning illegal behaviour present low state dependence, respectively
18% for crime, 28% crime and school, 26% crime and work. In particular, data
show that a person choosing crime at a-1 is more likely to stay at home at age a.
The latter pattern may be a consequence of an efficient police force and justice sys-
tem. Table 3.3 reports data on arrest and imprisonment for the sub-sample of youth
choosing a crime-related alternative. The pattern presented in Table 3.3 displays
that 73% of youth committing a crime managed to avoid arrest and incarceration,
while 27% were arrested and not incarcerated. Further, 12% of arrested individuals
were then incarcerated.
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Table 3.3: ARREST AND INCARCERATION TWO-WAY FREQUENCY TABLE
Incarceration Arrest
Status No Yes
Not in Jail 73.1 26.87
87.8
In Jail 12.2
NOTES: Figures are row percentages and column percentages (italic).
In Table 3.4 reduced form results, obtained using OLS method, are reported
for legal and illegal wages, while table 3.5 presents the estimates of a logit model
for the binary variable Arresta, equal to 1 if the youth is arrested at age a, and 0
otherwise. It is assumed that schooling and experience determine real legal wage
and real criminal wage (both in 2003$) as in a Mincer equation (Mincer, 1974).
Schooling is defined by high school completion for the legal sector, while social
criminal capital describes schooling in the illegal one.
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Table 3.4: REDUCED FORM RESULTS FOR LEGAL AND ILLEGAL WAGE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(real wage) Log(real criminal wage)
High school graduate 0.117*** 0.116*** 0.109**
(0.043) (0.044) (0.045)
Social Criminal Capital 0.579*** 0.572** 0.588***
(0.223) (0.223) (0.226)
Xa 0.279*** 0.279*** 0.248*** 0.606** 0.545** 0.539**
(0.043) (0.043) (0.046) (0.249) (0.249) (0.249)
X2a -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.014** -0.038 -0.030 -0.035
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038)
Jaila -0.010 -0.010 0.568*** 0.547***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.207) (0.210)
I(age19−22) 0.151*** 0.278
(0.054) (0.320)
Constant 8.905*** 8.907*** 8.853*** 5.010*** 4.879*** 4.884***
(0.089) (0.089) (0.087) (0.330) (0.336) (0.336)
R-squared 0.151 0.151 0.157 0.085 0.107 0.109
Adj.R-Squared 0.149 0.149 0.154 0.076 0.095 0.094
F_stat 72.59 54.73 49.16 11.409 9.734 7.814
NOTES: robust standard errors in brackets.
* P<0.1; ** P<0.05; *** P<0.01
Results in columns (1) and (2) of table 3.4 show the importance of schooling in
determining youth wages, with people graduating from high school earning around
12% more compared to individuals that do not have a high school qualification.
The estimate is statistically significant at 1%. Experience plays a major role in de-
termining wages for youth, being associated to an increase of 28% of wage for an
additional year of work. Considering that the estimates are for the age range 14-22,
it seems a plausible result since youth may move quickly from one job to another
and decide to increase/decrease the number of hours spent working during the year.
Column(3) reports the results of the regression model with an additional regressor,
I(age19−22), indicating whether the youth is in the age range 19-22. The effect of
experience on wages decreases using the additional independent variable. In addi-
tion, the effect of having spent time in jail is explored, resulting in a negative and
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statistically insignificant effect on legal wage but in a positive and statistically sig-
nificant effect on criminal wage. Column (4), (5) and (6) explore the determinants
of criminal wage. Social criminal capital has a large significant impact on illegal
wage, the returns in the illegal sectors are around 58% higher for individuals that
can benefit from the ’school of crime’. The effect of criminal experience has a large
and significant impact on illegal wage, while its squared functional form is negative
but insignificant. However, conducting an F-test on joint significance of experience
coefficients, the assumption of a non-quadratic relation between illegal earnings and
experience can be rejected. Table 3.5 shows the results for a logit model and a logit
model with random effects of the probability of arrest given criminal experience and
social criminal capital. Column(1) reports a positive effect of criminal experience
and ’illegal schooling’ on the probability of apprehension in a logit model, whereas
squared experience can have a negative impact. Although none of the coefficients is
statistically significant (except for the constant), the Chi squared statistics indicate
that a rejection of the null hypothesis stating the insignificance of the model is pos-
sible. In Column(2) the outcomes obtained through the random effects model are
reported. The sign of the effect remains the same, while estimated crime experience
effect becomes positive at 10% significance level. The random effects estimation
strategy is preferred since the results obtained with the fixed effects estimator indi-
cate a possible correlation between the unobserved time-invariant characteristics of
an individual and the independent variables, invalidating the latter estimation strat-
egy. The assumption of the fixed effects method is unlikely to hold in the proposed
model for criminal wage and arrest probability.
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Table 3.5: REDUCED FORM RESULTS FOR ARREST PROBABILITY
(1) (2)
Xa 0.479 0.610*
(0.335) (0.368)
X2a -0.018 -0.034
(0.052) (0.054)
Social criminal capital 0.389 0.433
(0.267) (0.303)
Constant -1.823*** -2.082***
(0.472) (0.563)
Wald Chi2 13.38 15.68
Pseudo R2 0.044
NOTES: Standard errors in brackets.
* P<0.1; ** P<0.05; *** P<0.01
3.3 Model
3.3.1 Model structure
The model considers a finite decision horizon, with the start of decision period be-
ing age 14 and the end being 22. At each age a, an individual can choose between
human and/or criminal capital and none. Each period the youth faces seven al-
ternatives: school, d1,a = {0,1}, work, d2,a = {0,1}, crime, d3,a = {0,1}, home,
d4,a = {0,1} or a combination of work and school, d5,a = {0,1}, school and crime,
d6,a = {0,1} ,or work and crime, d7,a = {0,1}; with dr,aequal to 1 if alternative r is
chosen and 0 otherwise, with r=1,...,7. The individual increases his human capital
choosing school and work or a combination with them, while criminal capital is
accumulated by choosing crime or a combination of crime and school or crime and
work.
Unobserved heterogeneity is one of the determinants of individual’s choices13.
It is possible to account for unobserved heterogeneity by assuming that there are
13The importance of heterogeneity in determining criminal choices has also be emphasised in
previous work, e.g. Lochner(2004), Merlo and Wolpin (2009).
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a finite number of types. There are two types of individuals in the model. Each
type probability depends on some important characteristics that may induce the
young man to choose one of the alternatives. In particular, parents’ higher education
contributes to determine the probability that the individual is type1, and more keen
to choose legal opportunities. Type2 probability is constructed using information on
low expectation of arrest at age 13 if a crime is committed, thus helping to identify
high able criminal.
Following Keane & Wolpin (1997), a system of rewards, containing the benefits
for each alternative, is presented. If an individual at age a decides to work, the
reward for this choice is the wage, wla, presented in equation (3.1):
Re,a = wla = exp(β0+β1Sa+β2Xa+β3X
2
a +β4type1+ ε1,a) (3.1)
Wage is a function of schooling, work experience and a productivity shock at
age a, ε1,a, with experience at a, Xa, presenting a quadratic term, as in a Mincer
equation. Given the focus on young men, and the terminal decision period at age
22, the specification uses a dichotomous variable, which indicates whether the indi-
vidual completed high school or not at age a, Sa.
Work experience is set equal to zero as initial condition and evolves over time
as in (3.2):
Xa = Xa−1+d2,a+d5,a+d7,a (3.2)
To determine whether an individual has a delinquent peer the following logistic
function is used:
Pr(Soca|Aa) = exp(φ0+φ1Aa)1+ exp(φ0+φ1Aa)
where the local social iteration variable depends on the presence of criminal
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groups in the area each period (Aa) and a constant.
If an individual decides to engage in criminal activity, the reward accompanying
his choice is the illegal wage, wca, given by:
Rc,a = wca = exp(δ0+δ1Soca+δ2Za+δ3Z
2
a+δ4type2+ ε2,a) (3.3)
with ε2,a being the crime related productivity shock. The illegal earnings func-
tion presents a quadratic term for experience in illegal activity, Za, while Soca ac-
counts for the effect of local social interactions with delinquents on illegal rewards.
As for work, initial criminal experience is assumed to be zero, and its law of
motion is:
Za = Za−1+d3,a+d6,a+d7,a (3.4)
If crime is chosen, criminal capital, Hca , increases following equation (3.5):
Hca = H
c
a−1+d3,a+d6,a+d7,a+δ5Soca (3.5)
Furthermore, if the youth commits a felony, he encounters a probability of being
arrested that depends on criminal capital and the type of individual as in (3.6),
Pr(Arresta|Hca , type2) = exp(γ0+γ1H
c
a+γ2Hc
2
a γ3type2)
1+exp(γ0+γ1Hca+γ2Hc
2
a +γ3type2)
(3.6)
Equation (3.6) reflects the cost of spending time in the illegal sector, resulting
in a higher probability of being arrested, which reduces when the youth becomes a
more able criminal, with γ2 < 0.
Arrest may lead to incarceration and time spent in prison can increase the level
of criminal capital. Furthermore, imprisonment has a negative effect on human
capital through depreciation and/or stigma effect. Individuals can again choose
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among the seven alternatives when the sentence is over.
In addition to single choices, the youth can choose to combine two alternatives.
This leads to a reduction of the time available to each choice and, consequently, of
the rewards. An individual working in both the legal and illegal sectors faces the
reward presented in (3.7)
Rec,a = f (wla,w
c
a,ρ1,ρ2) (3.7)
The youth sacrifices a part of his wage (depending on ρ1) in order to spend part
of his time committing crimes. He also loses a portion of his illegal earnings (de-
pending on ρ2). An individual can commit offences while at work; but, sacrificing
working time to crime leads to a shift in productivity and, consequently, wage.
The non-working alternative school has implications for earnings and increases
skills endowment and consequently, human capital, H la. Possible rewards for schooling,w
p
a ,
can be formalized as follows:
Rs,a = wpa = exp(τ0− τ1Sa+ τ2type1+ ε3a) (3.8)
with ε3,aas shock. Schooling rewards differ among individuals according to
their type and whether they are enrolled at university or not (to account for the
tuition cost).
Furthermore, the youth can decide to combine the last alternative with work or
crime. If the individual decides to work and enrol in education, then he faces the
reward function (3.9):
Rsw,a = f (wla,w
p
a ,ρ3,ρ4) (3.9)
The youth has to split his time between the two activities and, as a consequence, his
wage is lower compared to full time employment (depending on ρ3). In addition,
55
3.3 Model
the alternative source of income reduces schooling reward (depending on ρ4).
School can also be combined with crime. And, as for the previous cases, the
reward accounts for the lack of full engagement in one of the two choices. Equation
(3.10) represents the reward for the alternative school and crime:
Rsc,a = f (wpa ,w
c
a,ρ5,ρ6) (3.10)
Lastly, an individual that chooses home can engage in home production and
leisure. Home productions implies that Ya goods with a fixed price, p, will be pro-
duced together with leisure,Γa. The reward for this alternative is:
Rh,a = pYa+ηΓa+ ε4,a (3.11)
where η is a weight for Leisure at age a, and ε4,ais the shock for the home
alternative.
The joint distribution of shocks is (ε1,a,ε2,a,ε3,a,ε4,a)∼N(0,Σ), with the variance-
covariance matrix given by Σ= LLT where L is a lower triangular matrix represent-
ing the Cholesky factor. L specification allows for non-zero covariances and it is
presented below:
L=

l11 0 0 0
0 l22 0 0
0 l32 l33 0
0 l42 l43 l44

The structure of the model is used to determine through which choices young
men maximize remaining expected rewards.
The maximization process accounts for the mechanisms of the model, which
show the importance of dynamics given the influence of today’s decisions on to-
morrow’s outcomes. An individual choosing a non-combined crime alternative over
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legal opportunities accumulates criminal capital, and has few incentives to switch to
a legal career path. However, he can accumulate human capital along with criminal
one if he decides to combine crime with schooling or work and giving up part of his
legal rewards. This produces future higher legal earnings and an important increase
in salary after school completion. Illegal alternatives, even if combined with legal
ones, can lead to apprehension and incarceration. Time spent in correction facilities
depreciates human capital and decreases salaries in the legal sectors, while working
as an additional source of criminal capital. Given the cost associated with crime,
such as apprehension and incarceration, the decision making process has to consider
not only the benefits associated to offences but also the costs.
3.3.2 Solution
An individual’s goal is to maximize his lifetime expected rewards, while his max-
imum expected present discount value of lifetime rewards at age a, taken over all
possible future choices and given the state space and the discount factor, can be
written as in equation (3.12):
Va(Ωa) = maxdr,tE
{
A
∑
t=a
δ t−a
[
7
∑
r=1
Rr,adr,a
]
|Ωa
}
(3.12)
where Ωa represents the state space for the youth at age a. The state space
for each age includes Xa, Za , accumulated years of schooling and of the different
combined choices (e.g. school and work, work and crime, etc.) at a, and a shock
that the researcher does not observe.
Equation (3.13) represents the alternative specific value function:
Vra(Ωa) = Rra(Ωa)+δE [Va+1(Ωa+1)|Ωa,dra = 1] (3.13)
that reduces to VrA(ΩA) = RrA(ΩA) at age A.
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A full numerical solution of the model is obtained via backward recursion start-
ing from the last period of interest. The decision process involves the comparison
of the seven value functions and the choice of the one with the highest value.
3.4 Estimation
3.4.1 Estimation technique
Simulated method of moments (SMM) is used to estimate the parameters in the
model. In the SMM approach parameters are selected to minimize the weighted
distance between chosen moments from actual data and the theoretical counterparts
obtained from the simulation of a structural model (McFadden, 1989). Equation
(3.14) shows the concept formally:
θˆSMM = argmin[ψd−ψs(θ)]′W [ψd−ψs(θ)] (3.14)
where θ represents a set of structural parameters to estimate, ψd is a vector of
moments obtained from observed data, ψsis an average of vector moments derived
from S simulations, and W represents a weighting matrix used to achieve efficient
estimators when the model is over-identified.
This work uses an identity matrix as weighting matrix, providing consistent but
inefficient estimators for the model parameters due to the use of the same weight
for each moment. The objective function is minimized using the downhill sim-
plex method, a direct search derivative-free method developed by Nelder and Mead
(1965).
The chosen method can lead to valid estimates for the parameters of interest if
the selected moments are informative. Hence, moments selection should depend
on the parameters so that a slight change in parameters is translated into different
values for the moments. The next subsection discusses parameter identification.
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3.4.2 Identification
The selected moments, used to identify the 44 parameters of the model, ensure that
the model replicates trends and levels observed in the actual data. Chosen moments
comprise state frequencies, average legal and illegal earnings, variance of wages in
licit and illicit sectors, computed at different ages. These moments are useful to
identify the parameters generating occupational and criminal choices in the model
and the penalties associated with combined choices.
The average and variance of legal and illegal earnings, given youth previous
imprisonment status and arrest, are used as moments to enable the identification of
the stigma effect on wages for ex-convicts and the increase in criminal capital due
to imprisonment. Moreover, equations (3.1) and (3.3) are estimated by OLS for
the simulated dataset, and the distance between the obtained results and estimation
from actual data is minimized. This allow to further identity rewards parameters.
The proportion of arrested youths, is used to identify the probability of appre-
hension, while the proportion of individuals in correction facilities identifies the
detention rate. Furthermore, correlation between the binary variable defining crim-
inal organisation in the area and the dichotomous one identifying delinquent peer is
used to obtain the impact of the former on the latter.
A list of the moments used in the estimation can be found in Appendix B.4.
3.5 Estimation results
Table 3.6 and 3.7 report parameter estimates for key parameters and asymptotic
standard errors, while the simulated outcome produced by the SMM estimates is
reported in table 3.8 along with the NLSY97 data in order to asses model fit.
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3.5.1 Parameter estimates
Legal and illegal acquisition of skills plays a fundamental role in determining the
returns in licit and illicit sectors, as shown by the large magnitude of the coefficient
for returns to experience and to legal and illegal schooling in the wage equations.
Table 3.4 also presents a large magnitude for the coefficients of experience and
schooling, signalling that the structural estimation of the parameters is consistent
with the reduced form analysis.
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Table 3.6: SMM ESTIMATES
Legal wage Illegal wage School Return Home
Pr(Soc=1)
ln(wla) ln(w
c
a) ln(w
p
a ) Return
Constant 8.418 6.458 8.521 -3.053
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Sa 0.257 -0.310
(0.0058) (0.0002)
Xa 0.342
(0.0002)
X2a -0.064
(0.0005)
Type1 0.1981 0.650
(0.002) (0.0005)
Soca 0.726
(0.002)
Za 0.605
(0.001)
Z2a -0.028
(0.002)
Type2 0.355
(0.001)
ρ1 0.5807
(0.0001)
ρ2 0.2899
(0.002)
ρ3 0.460
(0.007)
ρ4 0.489
(0.012)
ρ5 0.396
(0.0001)
ρ6 0.045
(0.0026)
η 0.2109
(0.0003)
Aa 1.57
(0.002)
NOTES: Asymptotic standard errors are in brackets
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Table 3.7: SMM ESTIMATES (CONT’D)
Criminal Human
Pr(Arrest=1)
Capital Capital
Constant 0.127
(0.0002)
Soca 0.052
(0.003)
type 2 -0.221
(0.005)
Jaila 0.109
(0.0053)
H ladepreciation -0.081
(0.001)
Hca 0.185
(0.0027)
Hc
2
a -0.129
(0.002)
Cholesky elements
l33 l44 l43 l42
0.062 0.05 0.004 0.154
(0.0005) (0.095) (0.005) (0.862)
Type probability parameters
Type 1 Type 2
Constant 0.599 -2.733
(0.0035) (0.002)
Degree_parents 0.177
(0.001)
Lowexpectation 0.198
(0.0101)
NOTES: Asymptotic standard errors are in brackets
Table 3.6 and 3.7 illustrate how heterogeneity contributes to the determination
of the rewards and consequently to the decisions of young men. In particular, het-
erogeneity presents its stronger effect in the equation for the reward in choosing
school, thus confirming the idea that parents with higher education have a positive
influence on their children’s decisions. In the same equation, the higher cost asso-
ciated with university decreases the reward by 0.31%. Furthermore, heterogeneity
contributes to defining the probability of being arrested, with type 2 individuals,
constituting 6.8% of the population, facing a lower probability of apprehension.
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The results for criminal rewards can be compared to one previous empirical
work, Loughran et al. (2013). The authors argue that individuals may have a higher
reservation wage and decide to participate in illegal activity only if the returns can
off-set the risks associated with it. Thus, an individual with criminal experience
can commit offences leading to higher monetary returns, if he wants to off-set the
associated risk. This fact justifies the difference in returns to experience for legal
and illegal wage, respectively 0.343 and 0.605. Comparing the results for criminal
rewards to those obtained by Loughran et al. (2013), this study confirms the strong
positive effect on the returns to crime and social criminal capital.
As in the criminal capital literature, time spent in prison has a positive impact on
illegal skills accumulation and a negative effect on accumulated legal ones. In par-
ticular, the produced estimates are similar to the ones presented by Munyo (2013).
The suggested impact of imprisonment on criminal capital in the latter work is 0.09,
while the obtained estimate here is 0.109.
Results for combined alternatives indicate that a youth choosing to work and
enrol in school earns 46% of the wage he could obtain by choosing only work,
while his illegal wage will be 4% lower if he decides to engage in criminal activity
while attending school in the same period. The difference in the penalties can be
identified in the opportunity for the youth to commit certain felonies while at school
(e.g. selling stolen goods to school mates) whereas working cannot be conducted
while in school.
If the individual decides to work and commit crimes in the same time period,
his criminal and legal wages are respectively 29% and 58.1% lower. Again, the
difference may be a consequence of the possibility of committing crime while at
work.
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3.5.2 Model fit
Table 3.8 reports a comparison between simulated choice distributions and actual
ones. The comparison is presented for three age periods: 14-18, 19-22 and 14-22.
The bottom of table 3.8 assesses the match between actual arrest, imprisonment and
recidivism percentages with the simulated ones.
Table 3.8: ACTUAL AND PREDICTED OUTCOMES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
14-18 19-22 14-22
Home 0.061 0.076 0.168 0.152 0.105 0.11
School 0.687 0.699 0.183 0.156 0.477 0.458
Work 0.041 0.004 0.417 0.451 0.195 0.203
Crime 0.011 0.002 0.012 0.023 0.011 0.012
School and Work 0.118 0.120 0.179 0.181 0.143 0.147
School and Crime 0.080 0.095 0.009 0.00 0.051 0.053
Work and Crime 0.007 0.003 0.029 0.037 0.016 0.018
Arrested
Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
Social Hc(14-22) 0.268 0.273 Recidivism (14-22)
0.098 0.104 Jail if Arrested 0.318 0.304
0.122 0.113
NOTES: Figures are in row percentage.
Considering the results reported in table 3.8, the model matches actual data well.
In fact, it manages to fit the trend observed in table 3.2, with the majority of individ-
uals choosing school in the age range 14-18 and then preferring the work alternative
with its possible combinations. Crime plays a major role during adolescence with
around 10% of adolescents choosing crime and its combination both in the actual
and simulated data.
Furthermore, when considering the age range 14-22 (column (5) and (6)), the
highest difference between actual and predicted percentage is 1.9%, which is reg-
istered for the school alternative. This result is due to the underestimated rate of
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people attending school in the age range 18-22, as shown in columns (3) and (4).
Instead, the highest difference between actual and predicted results is for the work-
ing alternative in the age range 14-18. The model underestimates the state frequency
for work during the age range 14-18, while it overestimates it for the second range.
The difference in the percentage point of youth arrested and then imprisoned
are 0.005 and 0.009 respectively. Again, the model manages to match the data well.
The difference becomes smaller for the percentage of persons close to the youth that
are part of a gang: 0.006 percentage points.
The estimation results showed that the measures identifying criminal capital
have a large effect on criminal earnings, but this is not enough to lead a vast majority
of individuals to repeat their criminal choice in adulthood. The result is consistent
with the argument proposed by Lochner (2004). In fact, in choosing crime the
individual has to take into account the opportunity cost of his choice (the rewards
associated with alternative choices) and the risk of punishment. From table 3.8,
school and crime is chosen by 9.5% of individuals aged 14-18 of the simulated
dataset, but by none in the age range 19-22. Meanwhile, a proportional increase
in the other illegal alternatives is not observed. This indicates that choices change
when there is an alteration of the trade-offs and it may be a consequence of the
increased opportunity cost of crime.
Lastly, the model provides a good match for recidivism, providing evidence of
potential criminal capital accumulation while in correction facilities.
3.6 Policy simulations
This subsection presents simulation exercises for three policies with the potential of
reducing juvenile crime.
The first policy simulation implementation shows how policy makers interven-
tion can reduce crime through a decrease of the social measure of criminal capital.
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The second and third policies aim at increasing the opportunity cost of crime.
The importance of social interactions with delinquents has already been under-
lined in this work and in previous literature. Tools able to reduce the probability
of having a delinquent peer may be fundamental in decreasing illegal behaviour.
This can be tested using the proposed model, since its mechanisms allow to decide
whether policy aimed at decreasing social criminal capital can have an impact on
youth choices.
Programs implemented in chosen cities in the U.S., aimed at gang and juvenile
crime reduction had different outcomes. Successful programs had in common a
social intervention focusing on creating opportunities in education and community
mobilization. Policy makers can find valid allies in communities and education in
fighting crime. Strategies that can decrease the opportunities for gangs to gather and
commit crimes (e.g. surveillance of ’hot points’), and/or boost the message within
a community that crime is wrong and not accepted can be effective in reducing
gang/crime participation. In the model presented in Section 3.2, such policy imple-
mentation corresponds to a decrease in criminal groups’ presence and thus affects
the probability of having a delinquent peer.
Table 3.9 reports in column (2) the policy simulation result associated to a de-
crease in the likelihood of criminal behaviour in a peer of around 10%. This exer-
cise produces a reduction of peers with delinquent behaviour of around 5% - passing
from 10.4% to 5.8%. Additionally, a decrease of crime of 1.6% and an increase in
the youth arrested fraction can be observed. These results are due to the different
channels through which peers affect youth behaviour. In particular, there is a de-
crease in the rewards for crime and an increase in the probability of being arrested
due to a lower number of peers with delinquent behaviour.
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TABLE 3.9: COUNTERFACTUAL POLICIES
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline
Reduction Work-Study Ex-convicts
in Pr(Soca) Program Subsidy
Home 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.11
School 0.458 0.463 0.475 0.456
Work 0.202 0.209 0.216 0.211
Crime 0.011 0.006 0.005 0.010
School & Work 0.147 0.151 0.166 0.143
School & Crime 0.0527 0.050 0.041 0.0526
Work & Crime 0.018 0.009 0.006 0.0161
Arrest 0.2784 0.332 0.40 0.292
Jail if Arrested 0.107 0.110 10.9 0.107
Social Hc 0.104 0.058 0.104 0.104
∆c14−22 0.016 0.029 0.003
Recidivism 0.317 0.09
Column (3) and (4) show the results of simulated policies with the purpose of
increasing the opportunity cost of crime for high school students and ex-convicts
respectively. Column (3) reports the simulated outcomes associated with an ex-
tension of the work-study program already active in the U.S.. The federal work -
study program is a federally funded program that assists students in covering the
cost of higher education through a part-time work program. The policy simula-
tion exercise uses the idea of the program, and extends it to secondary education
students who have been arrested. If the youth commits a crime and police arrests
him, then he is enrolled in the program. From the reported outcome in Column (3),
it emerges that such a policy can decrease crime by almost 3% and increase the
portion of youth choosing legal alternatives. The policy also affects youths’ future
illegal choices and the fraction of arrested youth (increased to 0.40), thus meaning
that the lower investment in criminal capital has an impact on arrest and subsequent
criminal choices. Consequently, it is important to provide legal opportunities to
youth exhibiting criminal behaviours.
The last policy focuses on understanding how an increase in the opportunity
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cost of crime can help in reducing recidivism. Specifically, the simulated policy
looks at the impact of a subsidy of $3,500 on recidivism - the subsidy consists of an
increase in the accepted wage for full time employment for previously incarcerated
individuals. The results of column (4) indicate that a subsidy can help in keeping
ex-convicts away from crime. In fact, a subsidy for full employment is associated
with a decrease in recidivism of almost 23%.
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3.7 Conclusions
Criminal success is an important factor in determining criminal choices. Success is
due to the investment in criminal capital that each individual decides to undertake.
The literature does not provide an extensive framework for understanding the nature
of criminal capital, how it is acquired and what its consequences are. The present
study aims to fill the gap in the literature using a dynamic discrete choice model,
where the youth maximizes his discounted remaining rewards. The behavioural
model allows an individual to choose among seven alternatives leading to an in-
crease in legal and illegal skills. Further, contrary to previous dynamic discrete
choice models, and in line with the empirical literature on criminal capital, a central
role is played by the effect that local criminal interactions can have in determining
criminal choices and their associated rewards.
The model is used to match patterns observed in the NLSY97 which provides a
rich set of information on criminal activity and criminal justice history of the youth.
It also contains data on organised crime in the area (gangs), and participation in any
of these associations by someone close to the respondent. Also, it includes data
on enrolment status in education, number of hours worked and income from legal
and illegal sources. The information provided in the NLSY97 can be exploited for
the study of youth choices and criminal capital formation. Further, it may provide
opportunities for future research aimed at analysing the effect of specialization in
crime and the influence of drug use on criminal behaviour.
The parameters of the model are estimated through the simulated method of mo-
ments. The estimate of the returns to crime indicates a larger premium for criminal
activity compared to work experience. This is consistent with the idea that experi-
ence in crime can lead to a potentially more risky and profitable outcome. Results
from the DCDP model are consistent with empirical evidence produced in this work
using a simple OLS regression, and criminal capital literature. The effect of school-
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ing (legal and illegal) is positive and large in magnitude for both criminal and legal
wages, meaning that schooling plays a key role in the determination of illegal and
legal returns.
The model fit shows that the proposed model matches the actual data well. In
fact, the predictions exhibit the same trends for schooling, crime and work of the
actual data. Young men are more exposed to crime while attending high school and
a large drop in crime is observed after high school graduation.
Three policies are simulated in order to answer the following question: what
can be done to reduce juvenile crime? The first proposed solution is a decrease in
the probability of having a delinquent peer. Such a decrease activates a mechanism
that leads to a reduction of the criminal wage and capital, while an increase in the
probability of being arrested is observed. These factors lead to a decrease in the
proportion of youths choosing to commit offences. In particular, a decrease in the
probability of a delinquent peer of 10% is associated with a decrease in crime of
1.6%. The second simulated policy has a larger impact on crime and consists of an
extension of the U.S. work-study program to troubled adolescents attending high
school. Its application increases the opportunity cost of crime allowing the youth to
develop experience in the legal sector, which enables him to achieve higher work-
related rewards. The impact of such a policy is not only immediate, but it also
affects the decision process in the long-run. The last policy focuses on decreasing
recidivism through a subsidy of $3,500 to ex-convicts choosing full time employ-
ment. Results show a decrease in recidivism equal to around 23%, again underling
the important role played by the rewards offered by the alternative option.
In conclusion, this study shows the crucial importance of criminal embedded-
ness in the study of criminal choices and in the formation of criminal capital. It also
offers policy makers some guidance to contrast juvenile crime and recidivism.
Further studies can look at the link between crime and substance use, but also
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at different dimensions of criminal capital. A behavioural model accounting for the
decision to join a gang can also be produced, and the criminal capital concept used
to explain the career path within the criminal organisation.
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A Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Correlation between homicide rate and mafia homicide rate
Table A.1: CORRELATION BETWEEN MAFIA HOMICIDE RATE (PER 100,000
INHABITANTS) AND HOMICIDE RATE (ATTEMPTED AND COMMITTED, PER
100,000 INHABITANTS)
ln(Mafia homicide rate) ln(Homicide rate)
ln(Mafia Homicide rate) 1
ln(Homicide rate) 0.792 1
p-value 0.000
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A.2 Additional information on the instrument
A.2.1 Abortion rate per 1,000 women in Italian regions
Figure A.1: ABORTION RATE PER 1,000 WOMEN BETWEEN 1979-1995
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A.2.2 Correlation between abortion rate and GDP per capita
Table A.2: CORRELATION BETWEEN GDP PER CAPITA AND ABORTION RATE
FOR 1,000 WOMEN DURING THE PERIOD 1979-1995
ln(GDP per capita) ln(Abortion rate) ln(Abortion ratet−1)
ln(Abortion rate) 0.025 1 0.584
p-value 0.648 0.000
ln(Abortion ratet−1) 0.041 0.584 1
0.471 0.000
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A.3 The effect of homicide rate on productivity
Table A.3: ESTIMATION OF EQUATION (2.6) WITH GDP PER UNIT OF LABOUR
AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3)
ln(GDP per unit of labour) POLS FE IV
Homicide rate -0.030*** -0.021* -0.251***
(0.007) (0.012) (0.043)
Social Capital 0.146*** 0.022 -0.064**
(0.010) (0.013) (0.029)
Drop out rate -0.004 -0.029** 0.012
(0.013) (0.011) (0.015)
Construction/Government Spending 0.061*** -0.003 0.044
(0.015) (0.025) (0.046)
Investment/GDP -0.265*** -0.004 0.047
(0.045) (0.052) (0.043)
Firms creation rate 0.006 -0.005** -0.006*
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003)
Population Density 0.000*** 0.000 0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Trend 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
DU2008 0.047* 0.024** 0.021**
(0.025) (0.010) (0.010)
Du2009 -0.014 0.002 -0.015*
(0.029) (0.011) (0.008)
Constant 10.336*** 10.861***
(0.094) (0.140)
Observations 289 289 289
R-squared 0.693 0.442
Adj.R-Squared 0.682 0.422
F_stat 101.015 25.908 142.268
NOTE : * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in brackets
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A.4 The effect of homicide rate on productivity growth
Table A.4: ESTIMATION OF EQUATION (2.7) WITH GROWTH OF GDP PER UNIT
OF LABOUR AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Dependent variable: (1)
GDP per unit of labour growth rate
GDP per unit of labourt−1 -0.008
(0.011)
Homicide rate -0.039*
(0.023)
Social Capital -0.015*
(0.008)
Drop Out rate 0.023*
(0.013)
Construction/Government Spending -0.035
(0.030)
Investment/GDP 0.006
(0.026)
Firms creation rate 0.002
(0.002)
Population Density 0.0001
(0.000)
DUi2008 -0.019***
(0.007)
DUi2009 -0.037***
(0.005)
Observations 272
Number of instruments 15
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences, -0.95
p-value 0.344
Hansen test 1.58
p-value 0.904
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in brackets
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B Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Summary statistics for wages and criminal earnings
Table B.1: MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION FOR LEGAL AND ILLEGAL EARN-
INGS BY CHOICE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE HISTORY
Legal wage Illegal Wage
Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation
Work 18779.9 12136.5
Crime 3133.527 4954.894
Work and Crime 14479.65 9065.514 2102.683 6567.914
School and Work 11338.08 8154.636
School and Crime 2291.079 6604.435
Any Choice 15567.66 11157.53 2586.297 6241.781
Previously imprisoned 12494.56 8903.912 3149.126 5530.947
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B.2 The factors determining social criminal capital
Table B.2: LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL RESULTS WITH SOCIAL CRIMINAL
CAPITAL AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3)
Soca
Gang in neighbourhood 0.239*** 0.232*** 0.219***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Previous imprisonment 0.097*** 0.077***
(0.011) (0.012)
Cumulative experience in crime 0.022***
(0.003)
Parents with degree -0.024***
(0.005)
Age19-22 -0.032***
(0.005)
Constant 0.038*** 0.029*** 0.044***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
R-squared 0.119 0.130 0.141
Adj.R-Squared 0.119 0.130 0.141
F_stat 642.867 357.925 147.675
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in brackets
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B.3 What does affect criminal choice?
Table B.3: LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL RESULTS WITH CRIME AS DEPENDENT
VARIABLE
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3)
Pr(crime=1|X)
Soca 0.166*** 0.118*** 0.095***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.013)
Cumulative experience in crime 0.147*** 0.139***
(0.004) (0.004)
Gang in neighbourhood 0.027***
(0.007)
Previous imprisonment 0.042***
(0.011)
Age 0.039**
(0.016)
Age squared -0.002***
(0.00001)
Constant 0.075*** 0.010*** -0.123
(0.002) (0.002) (0.145)
R-squared 0.029 0.279 0.313
Adj.R-Squared 0.029 0.279 0.312
F_stat 193.168 747.446 302.564
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in brackets
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B.4 Moments used in the estimations
Table B.4: MOMENTS USED IN THE ESTIMATIONS
Moments
Choice distribution
Proportion of youths choosing crime, by specific age
Proportion of youths choosing crime and school, by specific age
Proportion of youths choosing crime and work, by specific age
Proportion of youths choosing work, by specific age
Proportion of youths choosing work and school, by specific age
Proportion of youths choosing school, by specific age
Proportion of youths choosing home, by specific age
Proportion of youths that completed high school
Criminal Wages
Average criminal wage by specific age
Average criminal wage by specific age and criminal justice history
Variance of criminal wage by specific age
Variance of criminal wage by specific age and criminal justice history
OLS regression of log criminal wage on experience, experience sq. and social criminal capital
Legal Wages
Average wage by specific age
Average wage by specific age and criminal justice history
Variance of criminal wage by specific age
Variance of criminal wage by specific age and criminal justice history
OLS regression of log wage on experience, experience sq. and high school completion
Apprehension, detention and social criminal capital
Proportion of youths arrested
Proportion of youths incarcerated
Proportion of youth with a delinquent peer
Correlation between criminal oganisation presence in the area and Soca
Total number of moments: 161
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